INTRODUCTION
The modern idea of a "welfare state" constitutes one of the most important achievements of European political thought. Old-age pensions, in turns, are a crucial feature of a modern welfare state and of a modern social market economy. Pensions are the main tool to provide citizens, on a large-scale basis, for acceptable welfare levels at retirement.
In face of this, demographic trends initialized in the past and now showing major effects, cast serious doubts on the future sustainability of national pension systems, as they are organized today. Countries worldwide are dealing with increasing budgetary problems to pay out pensions, due to population ageing and, especially in Europe, to an historical tendency towards early retirement. Awareness of this phenomena has triggered a widespread debate in all Member States of the European Union, as well as worldwide, about reforming national pensions systems. To date, almost every OECD country and EU Member State is debating the pension problem, and running its own reforms 3 . However, reforming a pension system is a "sensible target", because of the very nature and importance of pensions. There are economic, demographic, social and political aspects that must be considered. Furthermore, from a technical point of view there is a controversy about the empirical magnitude of the pensions problem, about the underlying economic theory, and consequently about best practices and policy advise to national governments. It is hence no surprise that the debate on pensions reforming has grown intensively and spans nowadays a variety of dimensions: from identifying appropriate actuarial formulae for computing benefits at retirement, to the general economic impact of different pension designs, to the more political issues of social consensus and implementation.
A central theme of the actual debate consists in the respective roles of the state and the private sector in organizing pensions provision in the future, and this is the theme of this article.
In section 2 we briefly describe pensions from an economic point of view, and define what is meant by a public and a private pension scheme. This is essential for the sequel of the paper, and to understand the ongoing debate on pension reforms.
In Section 3 we discuss the current problem of fiscal sustainability of public pensions.
In Section 4 we discuss how increasing the participation of the private sector to pension provision can help to achieve sustainability of pension systems in presence of the current demographic tendencies, and we elaborate on the effect of private pensions on saving and growth, on financial markets, and on individuals' protection against various types of risk. In Section 4 we take a cautious position in favour of widening the participation of the private sector to current pensions provision. We argue that this can be a successful strategy provided that the transition is coupled by careful policy interventions fostering financial markets regulation.
We give advice on such regulatory issues in Section 5. Our position is not one that calls for "more" regulation, rather it is one favouring its revision in a direction that accounts for the specific characteristics of pension plans. In Section 6 we conclude.
WHAT IS A PENSION SCHEME?
A pension is a contract under which an individual acquires the right to be transferred quotas of future output (the benefits), in exchange of quotas of his current output (the contributions). The contract establishes a point in time when this transfer starts, the retirement age.
In principle, an individual could "sign this contract with herself"; that is, she could store part of his own current production for future use. However, this is not viable for services and non-storable goods, for example health care and elderly services, clothing, food: and these are precisely the basic kind of good and services one is interested in after retirement.
In face of this physical constrain on individual actions, modern societies have coordinated individual pensions contracts into a pension system, where individuals do not need to consume own past production during their retirement time, but indeed consume output produced by the individuals working actively during that time. Every modern pension system constitutes essentially a transfer of output, in each period, from the current young generation, meant here as those actively working, to the current old generation, meant as those retired.
The current old generation can finance his claims on current production in different ways, and this constitutes a fundamental dimension along which pensions systems differ. Relative to the financial mechanism with which pension claims on current production are organized, pension systems fall theoretically into two broad categories.
In a pay-as-you-go system (PAYG), the current young generation contribute mandatorily to the pension system through labour income taxes, whose revenues are partly transfer to the current old generation as pension benefits. In doing so, the current young generation acquires the right to receive pension benefits when they get old. This system mimic explicitly the intergenerational transfer of resources embodied in any pension system.
In a funded pension system, the current young generation mandatorily contribute part of her labour income to a pension fund, which invests in financial assets. When the young generation retires, the fund pays out pension benefits in the form of lifetime annuities, which finance pensioners' consumption of goods and services produced by the current young generation. 4 Hence, in a PAYG system pensions are paid out of current income, while in a funded system they are paid out of the fund asset accumulation. It is worth mentioning that PAYG and funding are only different financial mechanisms to finance the intergenerational transfer of production from the current working generation, to the current retired generation.
PAYG systems are managed by the state, which taxes the workforce and coordinates the intergenerational transfers. Virtually all state pensions are PAYG. On the contrary funded schemes are generally run by private institutions, like insurance companies, large firms and industry sectors 5 . For this reason the debate about organizing pensions in the future as more PAYG or more funded takes the form of a debate about public versus private pension schemes 6 .
DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND THE PUBLIC PENSIONS INBALANCES
In this section we discuss the problem of the current fiscal sustainability of public pension systems. A PAYG system is fiscally sustainable, or financially balanced, when in each period, the total nominal contributions -given by the contribution rate times the average wage times the number of workers -equal the total pension expenses, given by the average pension times the number or pensioners 7 4 Funded schemes can be also based on voluntary contributions. All the analysis of this paper applies to voluntary contributions a well, while a main issue in the current pension debate is about the opportunity to have mandatory funding. 5 Theoretically the state could as well organize and entirely manage a funded pension system. The point is then to asses whether the system can be better run by the state or by market institutions. This is important, but left over for a further article. 6 Other than in the way they are financed, i.e. PAYG or funded, pension arrangements differ crucially in the relation between contributions and benefits that they embody. On this respect, a commonly used taxonomy distinguishes among pensions with defined-contribution, with defined-benefit and with notional defined-contribution. Barr and Diamond (2006) provides for the basics of this distinction. We pursue in this paper a wider approach and do not need to specify contribution-benefit relations. 7 See Barr (2000) . The balancing formula is more complex than this, including in particular the possibility for the public sector to lend and borrow plus a time variable. The simple version used here is enough for our discussion and avoids technical details.
In the OECD countries public spending for retirement pensions, that is the righthand-side of the balancing formula, is expected to rise dramatically in the next decades. Recent projections for the period 2000-2050 show that public age-related expenditures, as a percentage of GDP, may rise on average by about 7 points. In particular, the fraction of GDP represented by public spending for retirement pension and early-retirement programmes is projected to increase by almost 10 per cent in Norway, by 8 per cent in Spain and Korea, by 5 per cent in Germany and by almost 4 per cent in France (see Cotis, 2005, graph 3.) For the European Union, ECOFIN (2006) presents projections of an increase of the gross (before taxes) public spending in pensions of 2.3 and 2.2 percentage points of GDP, respectively, for EU 15 and EU 25. This implies that by 2050, EU 15 will spend almost 13 percent of its GDP to finance public pensions, while EU 25 will spend 12.8 percent (ECOFIN 2006, table 3.3) . Compared with 1990 spending in oldage pensions -largely the wider source of public pensions spending -it consists of a rise of more than 5 percentage points with respect to GDP for EU 15 (Whiteford and Whitehouse, 2006, table 1) .
The main reasons of this increases in public spending are demographic in nature, namely the confirmation of the tendency toward an increase in longevity and a decrease in fertility rates 8 . The demographic forces at work are captured by the projected trend of the old-age dependency ratio: the number of people aged 65 or more over the number of people aged between 15 and 64, the latter being a conventional measure of the consistency of the working population. EUROSTAT projects the old-age dependency ratio to increase from 25.4 per cent in 2008 to 53.5 in 2060 for the EU 27. 9 Meaning that if in 2008 we have 4 persons in working age for every person aged 65 or over, by 2060 this figure will drop to 2 persons in working age for every person aged 65 or over 10 . The projected increase in longevity, combined with a tendency towards early retirement, is responsible for the expected increase in the expenditure for retirement pensions. On the other hand, pension projected contributions are expected to fall because of the decreasing fertility rates. Indeed, lower fertility rates tends to lead to a decrease in the working population and, under reasonable assumptions on productivity, to a only moderate expansion of GDP. As a result, given the current public pension formulae, the system will experience serious fiscal imbalances, with an expected increase in the quota of GDP transferred from the young working generation to the retired old.
To achieve balanceness of public pension systems most OECD countries have reformed, or are in the process to reforming, their systems, either in isolation or within the revision of the whole system of social security.
There are however only three ways to correct a PAYG system, under the provision that no increases in public deficit are allowed: Increasing contributions, decreasing pension benefits, or increasing retirement age. Virtually all ongoing public pensions reforms are indeed introducing mixtures of these corrections. This is accomplished sometimes using the complexity of the actual pension systems to minimize the political cost of such reforms. Furthermore, besides reforming public systems, many countries are considering to introduce or expand the role of funded pension provision 11 . The World Bank has suggested that reforms should proceed with mixed systems of public-and private pensions, along a ''multi-pillar model '' 12 . At simplest, a threepillars version of this model has the following structure. A first pillar formed by a pay-as-you-go including some redistribution and poverty relief scheme. A second pillar mainly based on a mandatory membership of a privately or state managed, fully founded, scheme (e.g. occupational pension scheme). A third pillar based on a voluntary membership of a privately managed, fully founded, scheme.
PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE PENSION SCHEMES.
In this section we discuss how increasing the role of funded pension schemes can help to keep fiscal sustainability in the presence of population ageing. We also elaborate on the effect of private pensions on saving and growth, on financial markets and on individuals' protection against various types of risk, making comparison with a PAYG system when necessary.
4.1 Funding allows to keep the system financially balanced in face of population ageing. In a fully funded system each individual in a given generation, call it generation A, builds up her own "pile of financial activities" during her working life. At retirement, the accumulated activities get transformed into a pension annuity whose actual value exactly equal, for each individual, the value of the accumulated assets. Under population ageing, during the retirement period of generation A the working population will decrease. However, every individual in generation A has already accumulated her pension fund before retirement. Hence, the pension system has by construction enough "money" to pay out A's pensions. This argument is valid for each generation, and thus implies that a funded pension system, contrary to a PAYG, remains financially balanced in the presence of population ageing.
As pointed out in Barr (2000) and Barr and Diamond (2006) , the fact that a funded system stays financially balanced does not mean that it can keep invariant the real levels of pension annuities in presence of ageing. Their argument runs as follows. The decreasing of the working population implies -other things equal -a decrease in output. Hence, when generation A's pensioners use their annuities to buy good and services, an excess of demand may arise, leading to an inflationary process which lowers the real value of A's pension annuities 13 . While this argument is correct, it is somehow a minor concern. First, as we have seen, the funded pension system remains nominally balanced, and this is the important thing: financial imbalance may cause the system to break down, and this is the main actual concern and the one which has triggered the pension debate.
Second, Barr and Diamond's argument is essentially about economic growth. It is the lack of growth, due to the decrease in the working population, which lowers real pensions. But growth is a general problem, which affects both PAYG and funded systems, as well as the economy as a whole. Even if it is not known if a funded system is always more effectual than a PAYG system to foster economic growth (see next subsection), we know that surely both PAYG and funded system are fragile in the presence of lack of growth, but a funded system remains at least financially balanced.
We see these as arguments in favour of extending the role of funding in pensions provision.
Funding may increase saving.
As we mentioned in the previous subsection, it is not obvious that saving, and so economic growth, tends to be higher with funding than with PAYG 14 . Of course contributing to a pension fund means saving. But, as pointed out in Barr (2000) , mandatory contributions to a fund may reduce voluntary saving, for example because funded accounts bears a stronger parallel with voluntary saving. In this case the effect on total saving may be even negative. Furthermore, as discussed in Barr and Diamond (2006) , a shift from PAYG to funding decreases tax revenues due to diminishing mandatory contributions to the PAYG system, and this may lead the government to borrow additionally, again with ambiguous effect on saving.
These arguments are correct and relevant. However, while the second is sound, the first may be not totally convincing. The amount of income that an individual is willing to contribute for pension purposes may be decided by her independently on how the pension system is financed, PAYG or funded. If this is the case, or alternatively if a relevant part of individuals is not affected by the purely financial framing of the pension system in their contribution decision, then once the desired amount of pension contribution has been set, a PAYG system transfers directly these contributions to the current old generation, which uses it to consume, while a funded system keeps the contribution in the form of saving, making it eventually available to finance investments (under a correct functioning of financial markets).
As a conclusion, while the link between funding and saving is not obvious, funding may increase saving, while PAYG generally does not.
13 This is an equilibrium argument that applies in particular to the case where the accumulated financial activities are monetary, for example government bonds. A similar argument applies in the case of equities accumulation. 14 The link between saving and growth is itself non trivial. Conditions must be met for saving to translate into new investments, hence into growth. While this issue is far from the topic of this paper, we elaborate a little about it in subsection 4.4.
Funding ameliorate capital markets.
This is somehow a less controversial point, albeit again questionable in some cases. Funding will channel more income into financial activities, and this dimensional effect is generally beneficial: risk can be better spread on a wide market than on a narrow one, and a wider financial market implies more efficient resource allocation and hence more growth.
However, a well functioning financial market needs attentive government regulation. We elaborate more on this Section 5.
Funding, PAYG, risk and uncertainty.
As for any financial contract, pension contracts have to deal with several sources of risk. Therefore, it is crucial to evaluate the effects of different pension schemes on the distribution of risk. In particular, who will bear the risk of longevity and earning losses (due to job loss or to different wage dynamics over his working life). In principle, the risk should be mostly transferred to the agent who has the lowest risk aversion: if the private fund, say, managed by an insurance company is risk-neutral with respect to the specific risks considered, it is efficient that it bears all risk.
In general the private fund does not bear risk from earning losses, which is -in absence of other insurance mechanisms -fully translated to the pensioner. A pension subscriber receives pension benefits which vary depending on her earnings, contributions, retirement age, life expectancy, and the interest rate that the fund management expects to earn over the lifetime of the annuity. Uncertainty over these last two variables lead to ''annuity risk'' (see Barr (2000) ). Instead, longevity risk is bared by the insurance company under a purely defined-contribution scheme.
Economists sometimes make a distinction between uncertainty and risk. The idea is that not all the uncertainty is translated into risk. Individuals may not be aware of some contingencies, or may just not be able to evaluate their likelihood.
There are sources of uncertainty and risk that affect both funded and PAYG systems, such as macroeconomic and demographic shocks and political risks. But there are risks which affect private pensions but not PAYG systems, the most immediate being the risk of low return on the financial activities in which contribution are invested 15 . There is also a class of risks, that we call here contractual risk, which are typical of funded systems.
Contractual risk. Most contractual risk originates from the fact that parties information, at the various stages of the pension contract, are asymmetric. For example, the pension subscriber is not perfectly informed about the investing strategies of the fund management, and the fund management has fewer information than the pension subscriber about her relevant characteristics, for instance her life expectancy. The first case represents what is referred to in economics as a "moral hazard" problem. More generally, a contractual risk arising from the possibility of one of the party to execute the contract choosing different actions, some of which may negatively affect the other party. The second case is an "adverse selection" problem. More generally, a contractual risk mostly emerging at the time in which the contract is signed, because one party has fewer information on some characteristics of the other party, which may sensibly affect the future outcome of the contract.
An instance of this market imperfections can be seen in occupational pension schemes. Moral hazard and adverse selection, for example, seem to explain why employees stick to the pension offered by their employer, even if not mandatory, rather than choosing the scheme offered by someone else (a third party). In fact, first, the employer has privileged information on his employee, thus mitigating adverse selection. He is therefore able to offer a pension scheme at lower costs with respect to third parties. Second, the employee may be biased toward his employer's offer because he knows him, and can obtain information on his general activity at a lower cost 16 . Observe that some forms of contractual risks may show up also in a PAYG public pension system, but to a lesser extent than with a private funded system. For example the adverse selection problem is relevant in a PAYG system as well, but less dramatic due to the wider number of people involved in the same pension scheme 17 . The Moral hazard in a PAYG system exists too, but is even less dangerous since in general the features of the public plans are established by law.
Another form of risk coming from asymmetric information in a funded system is the management risk. The return to contributions depend on how contributions are invested. Management risk is the risk associated to bad investing strategies by the fund. The fund management may be incompetent, or may be plagued by conflict-ofinterest. For example, with occupational pension schemes an employer may intentionally use contributions to overinvest in his own equities, which -being positively correlated with the corporation results -will tend to increase the risk of earning losses: in the extreme, if the corporation defaults, absent an insurance on the pension scheme, the employee looses his job and his pension (Enron case).
Uncertainty is also more pronounced with private pension contracts. Sticking with mandatory pensions, what we called management risk is, for many individuals, management uncertainty. As the Swedish recent experience taught it is difficult for employed workers to evaluate a wide menu of different pension products just because they are not able to evaluate their uncertain characteristics.
18 For pensions this problem is even more dramatic than for other financial assets, because o pension schemes are highly illiquid assets, and o pension subscribers have often no previous experience of this type of financial instrument, and will only build up one much later in life, possibly, at retirement.
16 Obviously, this last point is correct only if the outside funds, are otherwise equal in term of risk-return characteristics with respect to the one offered by the employer's. 17 The idea is that if all people are under the same pension scheme, their expected longevity can be estimated looking at the expected longevity of the whole population, which is easily obtain from demographic statistics. 18 Sundén (2006).
TOWARDS PRIVATE PENSIONS: GOVERNMENT REGULATION
In the previous section we have seen that a funded system, compared to a PAYG system, keeps pension provision financially viable in the face of population ageing, could help increase saving and growth, and can make financial market more efficient.
These are important arguments in favour of funding. But we have also seen that asymmetric information bears to private pensions an entire class of risks, the contractual risks. This problem requires that a move to funding be assisted by a careful effort to regulate financial markets.
In this section, we discuss financial markets regulation and identify some specific directions of intervention. Our position is not one that calls for "more" regulation. Rather, we favour a revision of current regulation in a direction that accounts for the peculiar characteristics of pension plans.
We start from the perspective that it is important that consumers be sufficiently protected against contractual risk. Precisely a regulatory system should avoid a situation in which consumers bear ''too much risk'', especially of a type they are often unable to value, as opposed as the risk transferred to intermediaries or financial institutions. This is even more important for pension schemes because, as we have said, (i) pensions are highly illiquid assets, and (ii) subscribers face a good deal of uncertainty at the time of subscription and, by the time they experience the product chosen it is probably too late to switch to another one.
Regulation may mitigate these two common aspects of private pension schemes. The degree of liquidity of a pension scheme is partially due to the regulatory system, and can be increased. An example, is the recent experience of mortgage contracts, which in some countries can be renegotiated at reasonable cost. For pension schemes, renegotiation may also include the possibility to switch funds and their providers. Clearly, this would call for a sufficiently high degree of standardization of pension plans. Regulatory interventions in the direction of higher standardization may also help to improve the individuals' knowledge of pension products, thereby reducing individuals' uncertainty. The recent Swedish experience, with over 3000 funds taught that too much variety may be undesirable.
19 Nugée and Persuade (2006) , agreeing on the importance of protecting pension subscribers, suggest a regulatory system should target consumer protection, as opposed to the financial stability and soundness of pension institutions. The hart of their argument is as follows. To protect consumers against risk of provision of private pensions, the system should effectively regulate and supervise the characteristics of the pension fund products and activities. A third party, a public authority or private rating agencies, could certify that pension products belong to a certain category, meeting some standards. All other financial products and activities, not directly sold to consumers, may in principle be left unclassified and unregulated.
On the contrary, current financial regulation in the spirit of Basle II is now largely based on imposing accounting standards and principles on financial institutions. Monitoring often reduces to require pension funds to provide ''fair-value'' of their current financial assets and liabilities at prespecified dates. Yet these static financial evaluations may largely distort the picture of firms' investment strategies and risk management. 20 Indeed, because pensions are highly illiquid, funds' managers should overweight long-term assets, whose return pays a liquidity premium over short-or medium-term. Yet, under the current prevailing accounting standards, this would imply an higher volatility of liabilities, forcing managers to choose between either more liquid assets or higher solvency reserve position. Since both strategies lower the return to contributions, managers have often tried to increase returns by increasing the proportion of equities in portfolio. 21 This has precisely the effect to increase that type of sector or entrepreneurial risk which pension funds and subscribers should not be exposed to. It is essential that the employer fund does not bear this entrepreneurial risk; thus, either risk management strategies avoid this or the pension fund should be insured against the entrepreneurial default as, for example, in US and UK.
A regulation that requires the classification of pension products can protect consumers without distorting markets, and requires a much lighter and thus less costly monitoring system. One public, independent, authority (or private rating agencies) could analyze and classify those products which pension funds or other intermediaries aim at offering to consumers. This is a fairly simple task with respect to that of assessing a correct risk-management approach of each and every pension scheme, especially if some product standardization is introduced. Product regulation should enhance, or at least not discourage, financial innovation and firm entry. With respect to financial innovation, it is important that the classification/standardization and supervision process be not too tight and detailed for the firm. This could be achieved, for example, by establishing some minimum standards, in terms of plans characteristics (first, in term of return and risk) for each step of the classification.
This approach to regulation, based on consumer protection, can cope also with systemic risk. Financial institutions belong to an industry with a high level of interconnectedness. Banks, mortgage institutions, pension funds, and other financial operators are tight by a thick and complex web of lending and borrowing relationships. These relationship often involve firms of different counties. The failure or default of some of them may strongly destabilize the others, sometimes, causing default chains. Well known are the effects of bank run during the Great Depression, of the Asian financial cries in the nineties, and of the current mortgage crisis in the US.
Systemic risk is even more pronounced if financial operators tent to assume similar risk profiles, and risk management strategies. In that case, if something goes wrong for one, it is likely to go wrong for all of them. A product oriented regulation, by recognising the difference between financial institutions, would have the positive 20 Kortleve et al. (2006) 21 Danish Central Bank data show that the proportion of equities in pension funds' portfolio grow from 10 percent in 1990 to 40 per cent in 2002. effect to sustain and incentive different risk management strategies; with the pension funds investing long-term in more illiquid assets, banks bearing more standard forms of credit risk, and so on.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have taken a cautious position toward a wider participation of the private sector to current pension systems. We argue that this may be a successful strategy provided that the transition is coupled by pondered policy interventions fostering financial regulation. Our position is not one that calls for "more" regulation, rather it is one favouring its revision in a direction that first and foremost accounts for the peculiar characteristics of pension plans. This could be successfully accomplished following a regulatory approach that targets products characteristics and consumer protection; which, we argued, could be more effective and easier to implement than targeting pension funds directly.
We want to point out here that the whenever a pension system has a strong redistribution objective -in particular if referred to inter-generational redistributionthen there is room for a PAYG component as well, possibly endowed with correction devices. In this respect the public sector has more financing opportunities than any private institution. On the other hand, the rest of institutions which, according to the multipillar model, are part of the pension system, should be financially sustainable and target efficiency, and a funded system seems more appropriate in this respect.
